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The Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Subsidies, and the
Great Plains Wheat Case
The Tokyo round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations was concluded
and agreements on most subjects of negotiation were submitted to partici-
pating governments on April 12, 1979. The modifications made by the
Tokyo round to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rep-
resent a significant improvement in the terms which regulate subsidies.
In 1978 the European Economic Community (EEC) significantly
increased its wheat exports. Its sales usurped several traditional American
export markets, resulting in a loss of sales to those particular markets by
U.S. farmers. The American share of the total world wheat market, how-
ever, remained virtually unchanged from past years.
Prior to the 1979 GATT amendments, violations were measured by loss
of "world" market share, but the amendments changed the definitions by
which violations are gauged. The Great Plains Wheat case, seeking sanc-
tions against the EEC, arose just prior to the conclusion of the Tokyo talks.
This article will focus on the alterations in GATT's subsidy terms and the
effect that the changes will have on future cases like the one brought by
Great Plains Wheat.
1. History of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Realizing that some of the origins of the Great Depression and the Sec-
ond World War lay in trade conflicts among nations, the executive branch
of the U.S. government began to develop plans in the early 1940s for an
elaborate world organization to ease these tensions in the post-war era. ' To
*Mr. Bishop practices law in Dallas, Texas.
'J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 2.2 at 37 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WORLD TRADE].
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achieve this goal, the United States drafted a charter for the proposed Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO). 2 The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade began in 1946-47 as a specific trade agreement to institutionalize
tariff concessions as a part of the ITO structure. 3
The original terms of GATT were completed in October, 1947,4 and the
final terms of the ITO were finished in March, 1948.- The ITO was not
approved by Congress, 6 and the State Department announced in Decem-
ber, 1950, that it would not be resubmitted.7 Nevertheless, the president
committed the United States to GATT as an executive agreement. 8
Congress exhibited great hostility to GATT in its early years. In 1951,
for example, Congress imposed import quotas on fats, oils, and some dairy
products, in violation of United States GATT duties.9 This act required the
government to seek a waiver of its GATT obligations. Since other nations
had little choice but to accede to U.S. demands or risk losing GATT and its
benefits altogether, the waiver was granted in 1955.10 The waiver has been
a source of significant irritation between the United States and other GATT
countries since that time.
Substantial amendments were made to GATT in 1955. These changes
clarified and improved the trade rules considerably, but still left much to be
desired. Many of the proposals and additions made during this session rep-
resented an attempt to transfer to GATT the provisions and functions of the
ill-fated ITO." Along with the changes made in GATT, this session
approved the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) to administer
GATT.' 2 Unfortunately, the OTC received the same treatment by Con-
gress as the ITO, and U.S. involvement was prohibited. 13
Congress's attitude has undergone a change in recent years, as reflected
in the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, allowing the presi-
dent to participate in the Kennedy round of negotiations. 14 These negotia-
tions were begun in May, 1964, and concluded in June, 1967.15 Anti-
dumping rules and tariff cuts averaging 35 percent were agreed upon.' 6
1d. at 40.
3Id. § 2.3 at 42-43.4Id. at 45.
1d. § 2.5 at 49.
61d. at 50.
'U.S. State Dep't Press Release, December 6, 1950, printed in 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 977
(1950).
'Jackson, The General Agreement on Tarios and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66
MICH. L. REV. 250, 253-54 (1967). See 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947).
'65 Stat. 75 (1951).
"WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, § 27.6 at 735.
"Id. § 2.5 at 51.
121d.
13Id.
"476 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1962).
"THE TRADE DEBATE at 7 (Department of State Publication 8942 1979).
16Id.
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The Tokyo round of negotiations began in February, 1975, and ended in
April, 1979, with the signing of further amendments interpreting and imple-
menting the provisions of GATT. 17 The president negotiated the Tokyo
round under the broad authority granted him by the Trade Act of 1974.18
The Tokyo round was the seventh in a series of GATT negotiations, the
first of which culminated in the signing of the original GATT provisions in
1947.19 It was also the most ambitious, involving ninety-nine countries and
more crucial trade issues than any previous trade talks in history.20 Past
negotiations had focused primarily on tariff reductions, but as reductions
were made, nations began to turn to non-tariff measures to restrain
imports. 2 1 The Tokyo negotiations were aimed largely at controlling non-
tariff restrictions to international trade. 22 Historically, the seven rounds of
GATT negotiations could be described as the working out of international
trade tensions that disrupted world commerce so ruinously in the 1930s.
They have resulted in the adoption of the present rules, which ensure that
each country and its industries will have fair access to the channels of world
commerce.
2. Subsidies and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
GATT as originally concluded in 1947 did not restrict the use of subsi-
dies by governments. 23 It merely required signatories to report on the use
of subsidies and to consult with one another to attempt to limit the subsidies
if they resulted in or threatened serious prejudice to other contracting par-
ties.24 An importing nation could counter a subsidy with special duties if it
caused or threatened material injury to an established domestic industry of
the importing country.25 Exporting nations harmed by a contracting party's
use of subsidies could suspend the application to the other party of its obli-
gations or concessions under GATT if the suspension was approved by a
majority of the signatory countries acting jointly.26
The 1955 amendments to GATT created separate rules for the use of
subsidies on primary and nonprimary products. Subsidies on nonprimary
(e.g., industrial) products were banned if they resulted in exports priced
lower than the same goods in the domestic market.27 Parties were also
"MTN: MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS at 5 (Department of State Current Policy
56 [Revised] April 1979).
'Id. at 2.
i'Vd. at 1.
2 1d. at 5.
"THE TRADE DEBATE, supra note 15, at 7-8.2 Id. at 8.
261 Stat. A51, art. XVI (1947).241d.
"2Id., Art. VI, at A23.261d., Art. XXIII, at A64.
2'Text published in Appendix A, WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, art. XVI, § B, 4, at 828.
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implored to avoid subsidies on primary products (e.g., agricultural and
mineral products); but if applied, they could not be applied in a manner
resulting in a party having more than "an equitable share of world export
trade in that product," considering the market shares of the parties in a
previous representative period and any special factors affecting trade in the
product. 28 Nonprimary products are any goods other than primary prod-
ucts. Primary products are defined as:
... any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or
which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for
marketing in substantial volume in international trade.29
The condemnation of subsidies on primary products encompasses not only
export subsidies but also production subsidies that have the effect of
increasing exports. 30
The amendments provided little guidance for determining what was
more than a country's equitable share of world export trade. It did include
a statement in the interpretive notes that a contracting party which had not
exported a particular product in the previous representative period was not
precluded from establishing its right to obtain a share of international trade
in that product;3' but beyond this provision, the broad language of the
agreement provided no help in construing the nebulous and undefined con-
cept of "equitable share." Furthermore, the agreement's language focused
primarily on the beneficial effect to the exporting country granting the sub-
sidy rather than on the harmful effects to competing exporters or import-
ers.32 The term "previous representative period" was not defined and
created many difficulties, as did the determination of what special factors
were and which ones could be considered. Finally, the language "world
export trade" indicated that a country's equitable share was to be measured
by looking at the entire world market and not at any individual market.33
This was confirmed in 1959 by a Working Party report discussing Austra-
lia's allegations that French wheat exports to Southeast Asia rose because of
the use of subsidies. 34 The ambiguities, broad language, and focus of the
agreement made it very difficult to prove a case based on subsidies sufficient
to obtain official sanctions.
281d., Art. XVI, § B, 3, at 828.291d., Annex I, Notes and Supplementary Provisions to Article XVI, § B, at 872.
30 WORLD TRADE, supra note i, § 15.7, at 393.
3 WORLD TRADE, supra note 27, Annex I, Notes and Supplementary Provisions to Article
XVI, 3, No. i, at 872.
32The provision prohibits application of a subsidy "in a manner which results in that con-
tracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product
.... WORLD TRADE, supra note 27, art. XVI, § B, No. 3, at 828. The language of the
Treaty did not prohibit application of the subsidy in a manner resulting in a contracting party
being deprived of an equitable share of trade in the relevant product.
33WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, § 15.7, at 394-95.
34Id.
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3. Previous GATT Subsidy Cases
In the period from 1947 to 1969, over sixty GATT complaints were
filed.3 5 At least thirteen of them involved subsidies.36 Only one resulted in
approval given by GATT signatories to a contracting party's suspension of
concessions granted to another party pursuant to GATT. In 1951, Congress
amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 to require import quotas on
oils, fats, and some dairy products. The Netherlands filed a complaint
against the United States with GATT and received authority for many
years to impose a limit of 60,000 metric tons annually on its imports of
wheat and flour from the United States.37 Professor Jackson has pointed
out that this suspension was ineffective as a remedy because the effect on
the United States was negligible.38
In one of the earliest GATT cases, Chile filed a complaint against Aus-
tralia in 1949 because of the removal of a subsidy by Australia.39 Australia
subsidized two different but essentially interchangeable fertilizers. It had
bound itself to Chile to grant a tariff-free status for one. When Australia
removed the subsidy on this fertilizer but left intact the subsidy on the sec-
ond, price elasticity became a factor, and Chilean exports of fertilizer
dropped. A Working Party of five nations determined that Australia had
not breached the terms of GATT, but did hold that the benefits Chile
thought would accrue to it under GATT had been nullified or impaired by
Australia's actions and recommended that Australia either subsidize both
or neither of the fertilizers.40 The test enunciated by the Working Party for
nullification or impairment rested upon whether Australia's removal of the
subsidy on one fertilizer only "could . . . reasonably have been antici-
pated" by Chile during the negotiations for the concession.4' The two gov-
ernments eventually reached a settlement.42
In 1958 Australia complained about a French subsidy on wheat and flour
exports.43 The Working Party that considered this case concluded that
France's total wheat exports rose during the relevant time period, and that
this rise was almost entirely in the Southeast Asian market." Even though
it determined that a nation's equitable share is found by looking to the
entire world market and not individual markets, it decided that France had
violated the terms of GATT because its total market share had risen and
recommended that France take appropriate action to see that its subsidies
"Id. § 8.4, at 171.361d. § 15.4, at 379.
"Id. § 8.5, at 185.381d.





431d. § 15.4, at 380.
"Id. § 15.7, at 395.
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did not adversely affect Australian exports to Southeast Asia.45 A bilateral
settlement was reached and the matter closed. 4 6
Denmark brought a complaint against United Kingdom subsidies on
eggs and cattle in 1957 claiming that Danish exports to the U.K. had been
reduced and that they threatened other Danish export markets.4 7 The U.K.
assured Denmark that its subsidies were not designed to increase exports
and agreed to take steps to prevent exports based on these subsidies. 4 8 As a
result of these assurances, the case was settled.49
A complaint was filed against the United States by Malawi in 1967, 50
claiming that the United States maintained export subsidies on tobacco. 5 1
The Working Party formed to study the matter reached no conclusion on
the legality of the alleged subsidy, and the case was never settled because
the United States representative was not given authority to make any com-
mitments.5 2 Other complaints involving subsidies include a Greek charge
in 1952 that the United States imposed export subsidies on sultanas; a 1953
Italian and South African complaint that the U.S. provided export subsidies
on oranges; a Danish attack on U.S. export subsidies on poultry in 1956;
and a 1958 Australian complaint against Italian export subsidies on flour.53
4. Subsidies and the Tokyo Round
The Tokyo round provisions implementing and interpreting the older
and more general GATT rules also strengthened them. Article 9 places an
absolute ban on the use of subsidies for nonprimary products. 54 Article 10
retains the old "equitable share" test of the legality of subsidies on primary
products, 55 but adds two important paragraphs.
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 says that "more than an equitable share of
world export trade" includes the displacement of another signatory's
exports, considering developments in the world market.56 This is one of the
more important new provisions. The language changes the focus slightly so
as to deemphasize the effect on the exporting party granting the subsidy.
Displacement is a direct reference to the effect on the subsidizing exporter's
competitors. More importantly, displacement implies an effect in a particu-
lar area, such as a country or region, instead of the entire world market.
Market share, the standard arising from the 1955 GATT provisions, is the
4 5
1d.
' lId. § 15.4, at 380.
4 7
jd.4 1Id. at 381.
4 jd.
501d. § 15.7, at 395.
1Id. § 29.3 at 765.521d.
51Id. § 15.4, at 379-80, n.15.
'Text published in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 579, 599 (May 1979).
"Id. Art. 10, I, at 599.
1Id. Art. 10, 2(a), at 600.
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more appropriate test when considering effects on the general world mar-
ket. Displacement, a more definite concept, refers to particular transactions
and markets. Any other interpretation of this word would read it out of the
Tokyo terms and leave the signatories with the old provisions from which
they have attempted to escape.
The requirement for consideration of developments on world markets is
troublesome and yet necessary for use of the displacement test. The lan-
guage indicates that the shares of the parties during the previous represen-
tative period and the displacement itself are not to be given automatic effect
but are to be balanced against recent developments and trends in particular
markets. It allows the committee of signatories some discretion to consider
the nature and extent of the subsidy and the needs of the exporting nation
and to balance these factors against the effects of the subsidy on competing
exporters. This construction makes sense, considering that sovereign
nations are the subject of the inquiry, and they must of necessity maintain
sufficient freedom to protect their vital national interests in times of need.
The second part of this paragraph provides that traditional patterns of
supply to a country, region, or world market must be considered when
determining "equitable share" in new markets.57 The specific reference to
national and regional markets adds strength to the conclusion that the
Tokyo provisions change the focus from market shares in the general world
market to displacement in specific markets. In the context of this para-
graph, "shall be taken into account" does not mean that established market
shares in the country, region or world markets should be automatically pro-
jected onto the new market and fixed. It means, rather, that such a projec-
tion should be the starting point in making the required determination.
Displacement should remain the primary test in new markets, albeit to a
lesser degree than in established markets with set suppliers.
The term "previous representative period" is defined more concretely in
the last part of this paragraph than in the earlier GATT rules. 58 It is the
three most recent calendar years in which normal market conditions
existed.59 This is straightforward except for one obvious problem. What
are "normal market conditions"? They might be determined by reference
to an averaging of trade in a prior representative period. Instead of
mechanistically using trade averages, the better approach, when possible,
would be to consider conditions that affect the volume of supply and
demand and measure them not against a previous statistical average, but
against their previous usual effects on supply or demand. Thus, an early
frost may not change the average temperature or number of frosts for an
area, but it may kill crops and reduce the volume of available supply. Nev-
ertheless, statistical averaging can be a useful starting point to which other
factors can be added.
"Id. Art. 10, 2(b), at 600.
"Id. Art. 10, 2(c), at 600.
59d.
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The third paragraph of Article 10 is also significant. It prohibits export
subsidies on primary products from being granted in a manner resulting in
prices materially below those of other suppliers to the same market.60 Sev-
eral problems are presented by this paragraph. For example, at what point
should a price be considered materially below that of other suppliers? The
question of when a subsidy results in materially lower prices is also raised
by this section. Does a preexisting subsidy become illegal under this provi-
sion if normal market forces push competitors' prices significantly upward?
The answer should depend on whether the subsidy concerns only a one-
time transaction or is continuing. If the subsidy continues at the same level
for future transactions in addition to ones already under contract, then the
subsidy should be covered by this section.
Another problem concerns what prices the subsidized price is to be mea-
sured against. If the subsidized price is so low that no one bids against it,
then is there a price against which to judge whether it is materially lower?
The answer must be yes. A conclusion that a much lower price was not
materially below other suppliers because no one bid against it would lead to
absurd results. Furthermore, subsidized prices may drive down normal
market prices and lead to a detrimental price war. This may make it diffi-
cult or even impossible to determine if a subsidized price is materially low.
Subsidized prices should be judged against the most recent series of unsub-
sidized prices in a given market before the subsidized price was offered,
provided that these unsubsidized prices were not set in response to earlier
subsidized prices.
It is doubtful that a single measurement, such as five percent, could be
devised that would be commonly accepted to determine what is a "materi-
ally" lower price. In some industries, ten or twenty percent might not be
materially lower, while one or two percentage points might be materially
lower in other industries. Percentages can be a helpful starting point in this
analysis, but one must also look to the nature of the industry involved and
its -traditional pricing and trading patterns. Elasticity of supply and
demand in response to specified pricing changes are important factors and
should be considered. But if the information concerning the trading in
question and the most recent pattern of unsubsidized trading is sufficiently
telling, the determination can be made from data readily available in order
to eliminate the detrimental effects of subsidies as quickly as possible with-
out waiting for a full-scale investigation of world trading patterns in the
product involved.
5. The Great Plains Wheat Case
It is in this setting that the Great Plains Wheat case arose in 1978. Great
Plains Wheat, Inc. (GPW) is a nonprofit organization sponsored by wheat
commissions in nine states, whose primary objective is the development,
601d. Art. 10, 3, at 600.
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maintenance, and expansion of U.S. wheat exports in Latin America,
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. 6 1 On November 2, 1978, Great Plains
Wheat filed a complaint with the chairman of the Section 301 Committee of
the Special Trade Representative's Office. 6 2 The Section 301 Committee is
an ad hoc committee composed of representatives from various interested
government agencies. The complaint described the European Economic
Community's subsidies on wheat exports and requested the president to
"take all appropriate and feasible steps," including retaliatory counter-
measures, to obtain the elimination of these subsidies.
63
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was codified in Section 2411 of Title
19 of the United States Code before it was changed by the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979. Section 301 provided that if the president, acting
through the International Trade Commission or the Special Trade Repre-
sentative, found that a foreign nation provided subsidies on its exports to
the U.S. or to foreign markets and the subsidies resulted in a substantial
reduction of U.S. sales to those markets, then the president had to take
retaliatory action such as the imposition of countervailing duties or the sus-
pension of trade benefits or concessions.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 altered Section 301 so that it would
comply with the terms of GATT. Section 2411 of Title 19 has been signifi-
cantly rewritten, and Sections 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, and 2416 have been
added. With these changes, the taking of retaliatory actions by the presi-
dent is discretionary, 64 but upon request for such action 65 the Special Trade
Representative must determine what action, if any, to recommend to the
president. 66 If an investigation is initiated, the Special Trade Representa-
tive must seek consultations with the foreign government involved.
67
According to the Great Plains Wheat complaint, the EEC, as part of its
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), provides two types of restitutions (i.e.,
subsidies) on wheat exports.68 First, the community establishes and pub-
lishes current export subsidies on wheat for specific regions.6 9 Second, the
EEC export tender system provides subsidies on wheat exports to regions or
countries not designated under the other system. 70 Competitive bids under
which the traders specify the lowest subsidy they are willing to accept in
6
'Great Plains Wheat, Inc., Complaint, published at 43 Fed. Reg. 59,935 (1978). Great
Plains Wheat, Inc., merged with Western Wheat Associates, U.S.A., Inc., in 1980, and adopted
the common name of U.S. Wheat Associates, Inc.
21d. There is presently no method by which private parties can directly bring actions within
the dispute settlement process established by GATT; instead, 'they must rely upon their gov-
ernments to protect their interests. See Jackson, The GeneralAgreements on Tariffs and Trade,
in I INT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS at 51-52 (1977).63Complaint, supra note 61, at 59, 936.
- 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
519 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
'19 U.S.C. § 2414(a).




order to export a given amount of wheat provide the specific means by
which this system functions. 7'
Evidence submitted by Great Plains Wheat at the Section 301 hearing
showed that world wheat prices in 1978 and 1979 averaged in the area of
$3.85 per bushel or $141 per metric ton, while EEC domestic wheat, based
on price supports, ranged almost twice as high. 72 Therefore, it took a sub-
sidy of about $3.35 per bushel to make EEC wheat competitive in the world
export market.7 3 On wheat imported into the EEC, the community placed
a levy of $142 per metric ton, thereby doubling the price of the wheat when
sold within the EEC.74 Revenues obtained from this extraordinarily high
tariff were used to fund the community's subsidies on exports of surplus
agricultural products. 75
EEC wheat production increased from 38.5 million metric tons per year
in the 1977-78 period to 47.0 million metric tons in the 1978-79 season as a
result of high export prices (and good weather).7 6 EEC wheat is closely
akin to the three lower-quality U.S. wheats: hard red winter wheat, western
white wheat, and soft red winter wheat.77 These varieties have lower pro-
tein levels than the two classes of higher-quality U.S. wheats. 78 Some
higher-quality wheat must be added to the lower-quality wheat for milling
purposes, but the lower-quality wheat makes up the bulk of the finished
product for many areas of the world. 79 Accordingly, the three lower-quali-
ty wheats are the more competitive strains. 80
Because of the increased production, the community's increased wheat
exports in 1978 amounted to about 4.4 million metric tons. 81 GPW esti-
mated that most of this increase (about three-fourths of it) replaced U.S.
sales.82 As a result, the EEC percentage of world wheat exports jumped
from seven percent to twelve percent, 83 but the U.S. worldwide percentage
remained basically unchanged (in the 43 percent to 45 percent range).8 4
7GPW Complaint, supra note 61, at 59,936.
"Letter of February 14, 1979, from Michael Hall, President of GPW, to the Chairman of the
Section 301 Committee of the Office of the Special Trade Representative, at 5, published after
p. 37 of the Testimony of Michael Hall during the Section 301 Hearings on the GPW
Complaint.




"GPW Written Brief, published at 43 Fed. Reg. 59,939 (1978).
"1d. at 59,937; Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at 72.
7"Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at 43,118; Letter of February 14, 1979, supra
note 72, at 4-5.
"Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at 118.
"Id. supra note 73, at 118-19.
BOId.
GPW Complaint, supra note 61, at 59,936.
821d.
"GPW Written Brief, supra note 75, at 59,937; Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at
101.
"'GPW Written Brief, supra note 75, at 59,937; Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at
101.
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Specifically, GPW alleged that EEC's heavily subsidized wheat took the
following sales away from United States exporters in 1978:
1. EEC sold 50,000 tons of wheat to Brazil for a price of $3.67 per bushel, or
$135 per metric ton. This included a subsidy of $3.27 per bushel or $120 per
metric ton. Over 125,000 tons of United States wheat was rejected when offered
at a price of $3.88 per bushel or $143 per metric ton f.o.b. Gulf ports.85
2. EEC sold 202,500 tons of wheat to Morocco at a price of $3.54 per bushel, or
$130 per metric ton, f.o.b. French ports. Even though requested to do so by the
Moroccans, no United States exporter offered a bid in response to the EEC tender
because of the low price quoted.
86
3. EEC sold 75,000 tons of wheat to Brazil at a price of $132.75 per metric ton
f.o.b. French ports. U.S. wheat was offered in competition at $143 per metric ton,
but this offer was rejected.87
In addition, many other sales of EEC wheat were made to Brazil, Morocco,
Egypt, Portugal, Poland, the People's Republic of China, Chile, Finland,
and Sri Lanka at much lower prices than competing U.S. wheat because of
the high subsidies involved.88 All of these countries represent traditional
markets for U.S. wheat. In Morocco, the U.S. share of the wheat market
fell from about 40 percent to 21 percent during 1978.89
EEC-subsidized exports caused losses of U.S. wheat exports of approxi-
mately 3.3 million metric tons.90 Michael Hall, former President of GPW,
estimated losses of U.S. export revenues in the range of $700 million to $1
billion. 9 ' The effect on the American economy goes well beyond mere lost
revenues. Testimony at the GPW hearing revealed that over one million
jobs in the United States are related to agricultural exports. 92 In 1978 U.S.
agricultural exports amounted to $27.3 billion, producing a favorable trade
balance in agricultural commerce of $13.4 billion.93 Warren Lebeck, senior
executive vice president of the Chicago Board of Trade, has said:
[T]hese anti-competitive activities have contributed significantly to higher interest
rates, a weaker dollar and inflation. Add to this the fact that if we were permitted
to compete fairly, there would have been more jobs in export activities and it
follows, a reduction in unemployment. 94
5Letter of December 7, 1978, from Michael Hall to Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, pub-
lished at 43 Fed. Reg. 59,940, 59,941 (1978).
"Id.
1
7Letter of November 14, 1978, from Michael Hall to Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, pub-
lished at 43 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1978).
"See letter of December 7, 1978, supra note 85; letter of February 14, 1979, supra note 72;
letter of December 18, 1978, from Michael Hall to Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, published at
43 Fed. Reg. 59,940 (1978); letter of November 27, 1978, from Michael Hall to Ambassador
Robert S. Strauss, published at 43 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1978).
"Letter of September 18, 1979, from Michael Hall to the GPW Board of Directors, at 2
(Quoting from the Moroccan Quarterly Grain and Feed Report (Aug. 23, 1979).
"OGPW Complaint, supra note 61, at 59,936.
"Letter of February 14, 1978, supra note 72, at 6.
2Testimony of Warren W. Lebeck, senior executive vice president of Chicago Board of




Discussing the attitude of U.S. farmers, the president of the National Asso-
ciation of Wheat Growers, Winston Wilson, stated:
U.S. wheat producers depend on export markets for their livelihood, because two
out of every three bushels produced must be exported to have a viable wheat
economy. They have assessed themselves to develop overseas markets, idled
acreage to prevent a supply glut, and stored excess supplies in reserve to build an
inventory for future demand. They have taken the necessary market-oriented
steps to improve the supply-demand equation for wheat, and their efforts ought
not to be canceled by unfair competition in important foreign markets.95
GPW recommended that any or all of the following actions be taken
against the EEC: (a) the imposition of import duties on goods entering the
United States, (b) the creation of subsidies on exports of U.S. wheat to meet
the EEC competition, and (c) the filing of a GATT complaint. 96 On June 8,
1979, the Special Trade Representative's Office issued a letter which con-
cluded that GPW's complaint was valid.97 It promised to hold discussions
with the EEC and stated that "all appropriate efforts to protect" U.S. trade
interests would be undertaken if EEC subsidies continued to cause lost U.S.
wheat exports in the next marketing season. Thereafter, the Special Trade
Representative announced that, after negotiations between the parties, the
EEC was showing restraint in its export program, and the matter had been
satisfactorily resolved. 98
The community's response to the GPW complaint was informal. The
EEC withdrew from the Brazilian market and indicated that its harvest
would probably be much lower in the next market season and its exports
correspondingly reduced. With this, the EEC considered the matter closed.
The community also made it known that it considered the U.S. Section 301
process illegal under GATT.99
6. GATT, Section 301, and the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979
Article VI of GATT allows countries to impose countervailing duties on
the importation of subsidized goods, but only if the subsidy causes or
threatens material harm to an established domestic industry or materially
retards the development of a domestic industry.1° ° Section 301 provisions
were applied upon proof of the subsidy and a showing that substantial sales
"Testimony of Winston Wilson, president of National Association of Wheat Growers, dur-
ing the Section 301 Hearing on the GPW Complaint, at 130.
96Testimony of Michael Hall, supra note 73, at 61-63; Patterson, Keeping Them Happy Down
on the Farm, 36 FOREIGN POLICY 63, 65 (1979).
"Letter of June 8, 1979, from Alan William Wolff, deputy special representative for Trade
Negotiations, to Michael Hall.
"U.S. Wheat Associates, Inc., news release of July 25, 1980.
"Patterson, supra note 96, at 68.
'"WORLD TRADE, supra note 27, art. VI, 6, at 811; Metzger, Governmental Intervention in
the International Competitive Process.- Subsidies, Countervailing Duties, and "Voluntary"Agree-
ments Restraining Imports, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 623 (1974).
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of U.S. products were reduced because of the subsidy.' 0' Evidence of a
substantial volume of lost sales is closely akin to proof of material harm
and probably amounts to the same thing. The 1979 act did away with the
mechanistic Section 301 approach and left the taking of such action solely
at the president's discretion.
While GATT does not explicitly say that countermeasures must be
authorized by the contracting parties acting jointly, this is the implication
except for a few self-help provisions. Article 19 of the new Tokyo terms
provides:
No specific action against a subsidy of another signatory can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement, as interpreted by this
Agreement. 102
And Article 2 of the new rules says:
Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.' 0 3
It is clear that under the newly revised GATT rules, unilateral action by the
United States is improper, whether taken under the old Section 301 proce-
dure or under the new provisions of the 1979 Trade Agreement Act, unless
authorized by GATT.
As the Section 301 process was used by the government in the Great
Plains Wheat case, the conffict was more theoretical than real. Once the
requisite findings were made in the GPW case, the government held talks
with the EEC. The talks were successful with respect to the immediate
problems facing the parties, and the matter was held in abeyance to deter-
mine if the EEC subsidies would again surface and result in new problems.
If they did and further talks were unsuccessful, then the United States
would take the matter to the committee of signatories of GATT. 104 Only if
this committee failed to respond adequately, the U.S. government having
determined to act, would a conffict arise.
In this context, neither the Section 301 process nor the 1979 Act proce-
dures, when used as an internal forum to initiate the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedures, should be considered improper under GATT. They
would be improper only if they actually resulted in unilateral action, ignor-
ing or contravening the GATT process.
'01Before the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 became effective, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 provided, in
pertinent part:
(a) Whenever the President determines that a foreign country or instrumentality-
(3) provides subsidies (or other incentives having the effect of subsidies) on its exports of
one or more products to the United States or to other foreign markets which have the effect
of substantially reducing sales of the competitive United States product or products in the
United States or in those other foreign markets, . . . the President shall take all appropriate
and feasible steps within his power to obtain the elimination of such restrictions or subsidies
'°
2Art. 19, 1, in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 579, 612 (May 1979).
'
03Art. 2, 1, id. at 582.
"°Letter of June 8, 1979, supra note 97.
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The other response made by the EEC is that the use and application of
CAP subsidies is an internal matter and does not come within the domain
of GATT. 0 5 The EEC exports its surplus agricultural products in order to
obtain foreign exchange reserves to finance oil imports. 10 6 It can export its
farm products only if it subsidizes foreign sales. Since it fulfills an import-
ant EEC need, it is considered internal and non-negotiable.
This defense to a GATT complaint is untenable. A 1960 GATT Work-
ing Party drafted an illustrative list of practices generally considered as sub-
sidies. One practice is "[T]he provision by governments of direct subsidies
to exporters . ,,107 An annex to the terms adopted in the Tokyo round
also provides an illustrative list of subsidies. The first item listed is "[T]he
provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry con-
tingent upon export performance."' 0 8 The other practices defined as subsi-
dies are more subtle than those quoted above. The EEC restitutions fall
within these very clear provisions and are prohibited by GATT. The
exceptions to GATT listed in the general and security sections provide no
basis for a claim that the restrictions are exempted. 10 9
The only other defense that could be claimed by the EEC is that the
subsidies have been continuing for years and have been accepted by the
United States and other wheat exporting nations. This defense is similar to
the waiver or estoppel doctrines in American law." 0 The answer to this
argument is that the Tokyo provisions have changed and clarified the rules
of the game and that there can be no acceptance or waiver of practices
violative of the rules before they became effective. Any acquiescence in past
practices is easily explained by the ambiguity of the old GATT rules, the
fact that a showing of "equitable share" had to be made with reference to
the entire world market, and the low level of previous EEC wheat exports
as compared to exports in 1978.
7. Comparative Analysis of the
Great Plains Wheat Case under GATT
Under the old GATT rules, it would be more difficult for the United
States to prove a case. While the EEC's world market share increased in
1978 over the previous year, to obtain sanctions, the United States would
have to prove that the increase constituted more than the EEC's "equitable
share" of the entire world market and that 1977 or some other specified
period was the representative period against which to measure the EEC's
° Patterson, supra note 96, at 69. For a general discussion of CAP's relationship to GATT,
see J. ALLEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT (1960).
"Patterson, supra note 96, at 69.
'WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, § 15.5 at 384-85.
'°
8Annex (a) in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 579, 615 (May 1979).
"See arts. XX & XXI in WORLD TRADE, supra note 27, at 839-41.
'An implied waiver may not actually be a defense since GATT makes no provision except
for explicit waivers. See art. XXV in WORLD TRADE, supra note 27, at 846-47.
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market share. The difficulties in defining "equitable share" and "previous
representative period" become apparent in a concrete situation. Further-
more, under the old provisions, "special factors" affecting international
trade in the particular product could be given greater weight because of the
lack of specificity of the other terms. The EEC could argue with some force
that the particularly good weather resulted in the unusually large harvest
and that this was a special factor justifying the increased exports. Even
though a GATT case might be proved under these circumstances, it is not a
particularly strong case and justifies the government's decision to settle the
matter informally.
Under the provisions of the Tokyo terms, the U.S. complaint would be
much stronger. Displacement in particular markets is now the crucial test
of what "equitable share" means. This measuring rod is relatively simple
and easy to apply. The EEC subsidized exports clearly displaced some U.S.
sales to Brazil and Morocco and probably to other traditionally strong U.S.
markets as well. The EEC could argue that the good weather is a develop-
ment in the world market or a special factor that should be considered.
With the addition of the displacement test, special factors become less sig-
nificant because of the concreteness of the displacement examination. Par-
ticularly good weather is a development that should be taken into account,
but the high support payments probably had more to do with the increase
in the harvest than did the weather. Many nations had larger than average
crop yields in 1978 because of fine weather, but their export volume did not
rise nearly as much as did the EEC's. In short, the displacement test makes
a substantial difference in establishing a complaint.
The United States might also rely on another new provision-Article 10,
paragraph 3. The world wheat market is extremely volatile and price elas-
ticity, even in small shifts, is a significant factor. A price differential of
eleven dollars per metric ton, as in the two specific sales of EEC wheat to
Brazil noted earlier, is substantial and explains the change in suppliers.
The price at which the EEC sold wheat to Morocco is also materially lower
even though no bids were made against it. The EEC bid undercut previous
prices in the market by several dollars per metric ton, and the difference in
price was material to buyers in the world market.
8. Conclusion
The underlying issues that created the problem in 1978 remain to be
resolved. A test of the legality of the EEC subsidies is likely in the coming
years. The EEC's need for export revenues and the firmly entrenched posi-
tion of subsidies in the CAP make it difficult for the community to discon-
tinue the restitutions. The United States could hurt the EEC with certain
countervailing duties, but the tensions that would be created and the likely
response of the community make this a tough decision to embrace. The
EEC could reciprocate in kind with injurious consequences to the United
States. To prevent a return to the old days of unrestrained trade restrictions
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and conflicts, the United States should choose its course of action carefully.
Perhaps the best remedy that could be fashioned would be a voluntary
agreement under which the EEC would restrain its level of export subsidies
to traditionally strong U.S. markets and agree not to increase its price sup-
ports for wheat in a manner that would stimulate greater exports. The high
stakes in the world trade game make the sacrifices on both sides necessary.
